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“I’m here too, Girlfriend…”: 
Reclaiming Public Spaces for the Gendering of Civi l Society in Turkey 
 
Joyce Marie Mushaben 
  
Having encountered many deep pot-holes along its long road to democracy since the 1960s, Turkey’s 
renewed efforts to secure EU membership as of the late 1980s allowed it to take advantage of externally 
funded initiatives focusing on gender equality, minority rights and civil society formation during the 1990s. 
EU and international NGO rules requiring cooperation among previously antithetical activist groups have 
profoundly affected not only the country’s relations with the outside world but also a multitude of 
traditional societal relationships. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, appeals to Turkish nationalism regularly 
pitted secularist-feminists against female religious and Kurdish activists over issues ranging from headscarf 
use to honor killings, preventing a united front on behalf of women’s rights. Somewhat paradoxically, the 
brutal military coup of 1980, as well as the 2002 election of the “Islamic” Justice and Welfare Party (AKP), 
opened new avenues for civil society collaboration among equality activists, even as more young women 
began to practice hejab. This study examines the changing nature of women’s participation in Turkish civil 
society, as well as the changing relations among once “antagonistic” feminist groups, attributable not only 
to processes of Europeanization but also to generational change, new educational opportunity structures, 
and the rapid diffusion of communication technologies. 
  
Headed by religious conservative Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP), the Turkish government has 
taken a repressive, hard-line approach to a wide assortment of societal protests that commenced with the 
occupation of Gezi Park in late May 2013. Although the country has experienced many ups and downs along 
the road to democracy over the last four decades, the latest wave of excessive state force has been inflicted 
by the very party credited with introducing significant constitutional-legal reforms that were to pave the 
way for Turkey’s admission to the European Union. Erdoğan, in particular, has sought to blame the unrest on 
extremist “others,” as well as on international conspirators intent on destroying the “indivisible unity” of 
the nation. Ironically, his highly charged rhetorical efforts to divide and conquer the protestors while 
consolidating his own “50%” base has produced exactly the opposite effect. Visiting Istanbul at the height of 
the Gezi Park protests in June 2013, Germany’s Green Party leader Cem Özdemir expressed surprise at the 
motley assortment of students, Kurds, Alevis, atheists, Muslims, leftists, secularists, nationalists, 
environmentalists, human rights activists and even soccer teams sharing intense conversations between 
waves of tear-gas, water cannons and police-beatings. He concluded: "One almost has to congratulate 
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Erdoğan. Because of him, people have come together here who would normally be at each other's 
throats."1 
 
Turkey has encountered many deep pot-holes along its long road to democracy since 1959, but a renewed 
application for EU membership submitted by Prime Minister Turgut Özal in 1987 allowed it to take 
advantage of many externally funded initiatives focusing on gender equality, minority rights and civil society 
formation during the 1990s. Over the last decade, EU rules mandating cooperation among previously 
antithetical activist groups have profoundly affected not only the country’s relations with the outside world 
but also a multitude of traditional societal relationships. Satisfied that it had solved “the Women’s 
Question” with Kemalist reforms that accorded females the right to vote, run for office and engage in paid 
labor in the 1920s, the Turkish state exhibited little tolerance for real-existing societal differences along 
ethnic, religious and ideological lines. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, appeals to Turkish nationalism 
regularly pitted secularist-feminists against Kurdish women and female religious groups over issues ranging 
from headscarf use to honor killings, preventing a united front on behalf of gender rights. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the brutal military coup of 1980, as well as the election of the “Islamic” Justice and Welfare 
Party (AKP) in 2002, opened new avenues for civil society collaboration among equality advocates of all 
sorts, even as more young women began to practice hejab, first legalized in 2008. This study examines the 
changing nature of female participation in Turkish civil society, as well as the changing relations among once 
antagonistic women’s groups, attributable not only to processes of Europeanization but also to generational 
change, new educational opportunity structures, and the rapid diffusion of new communication 
technologies. 
  
Looking back over the last ten years, one can discern three factors that have played a special role in 
“building bridges” among once antagonistic societal forces in Turkey. The first involves demographic change, 
coupled with the rapid expansion of higher educational opportunity along “Bologna” lines, even without 
official EU membership. As of 2012, the total population numbered roughly 76 million; 43% of the 
population is under 24 years old, yielding a national median age of 29. By 2009, the share of young women 
and men attending institutions of higher education had risen to 32.6% and 33.4%, respectively (see 
Ruthenberg et al. 2012: 4). This means that nearly half of the population was born after the 1980 military 
coup that produced a brutal crackdown on right-wing and leftist parties. Given Turkey's rapidly expanding 
economy since the 1990s, it further implies that younger cohorts are generating a “revolution of rising 
expectations.” 
  
1 See http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/joblessness-among-young-turks-surges.aspx?pageID= 238&nid=46944. 
                                                 
   Working Paper No. 7|2015  
 
 
The second element centers on EU conditionality, coupled with new forms of cross-cutting cooperation 
nudged along by a wide assortment of international, national and local NGOs. Turkey’s blossoming project 
culture has triggered the professionalization of civic activism, the emergence of new political groups, the 
reshuffling of societal strata and institutional hierarchies, and the forging of new collaborative relationships 
among formerly adversarial associations (see Kuzmanovic 2010). Recent surveys indicate that while 
countless citizens are losing faith in the ever more authoritarian AKP government, they are simultaneously 
gaining confidence in their own ability to reshape the country, as manifested in the mushrooming of post-
Gezi “park fora,” comparable to the German Citizen Initiatives of the 1980s. 
  
The third factor driving democratization processes in Turkey pertains to the growing assertiveness of 
women themselves, including those found well beyond the major metropolitan areas, e.g., in eastern 
Anatolia and the Kurdish regions, where females have long been subject to collective stereotypes portraying 
them as backwards, religious, uneducated or, even worse, as predominantly “barefoot and pregnant.” 
Reflecting the experience of equality activists in other hybrid states inclined to mow down “political” 
opposition, Turkish women quickly learned to leverage support from international institutions to shame, 
blame and otherwise motivate their own leaders to undertake major constitutional and statutory reforms. 
By depoliticizing and externalizing their demands, they ironically opened the doors to new women's groups 
whose life-styles and demands are generally at odds with their own but whose needs are also shifting due 
to the neo-liberal economic policies of their preferred political party, the AKP. 
  
Attesting to the broader comparative significance of this hybrid case, I begin with brief a treatment of 
diverse globalization trends that have significantly reconfigured Turkey’s socio-economic landscape since 
the 1990s; the latter has laid the foundation for a genuine civil society, core elements of which manifested 
themselves through the Gezi park protests. Although some legal-constitutional reforms have been subject 
to a “two steps forward, one step backwards” dynamic, the transformational trajectory at work in Turkey 
finds its parallels in turn-arounds witnessed across the Central Eastern European (CEE) states in conjunction 
with their accession processes. I then review major reforms initiated in response to “EU conditionality,” 
before and after the AKP assumed power in 2002. While the period after 2005 witnessed a marked slowing 
in “top-down” efforts to meet acquis requirements, one also finds evidence of a growing internalization of 
EU norms and values “from below,” characterized by Nick Manning as “cognitive Europeanization.” 
(Manning 2007: 497) I illustrate this with a treatment of changing relations among formal and informal 
women's groups, all operating outside the formal EU negotiation process. I conclude with a brief description 
of the gendering of public space embodied by the Gezi Park demonstrations and women's special role in 
driving “generational change.”     
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 “No Country is an Island”: Global Causes, Local Effects  
Occupying the geostrategic site of many world-historical empires, Turkish rulers past and present would 
prefer to see themselves as shaping global conditions rather than as being continuously buffeted by them. 
The search for similarities between Turkish trends and protests elsewhere cannot be limited to simplified 
comparisons with “Arab Spring” states, however. The 2013 protests that began as a tree-saving exercise in 
Gezi Park mirror a wide spectrum of social movement trends witnessed on other continents. 
  
First and foremost, just as the protests of the late 1960s gave rise to a shared identity among post World 
War II baby-boomers, young cohorts participating in anti-globalization campaigns of the last ten years share 
a number of identity-building characteristics. Despite their nationally specific tactical repertoires, all rely 
heavily on “electronic activism,” taking their cues from transnational networks. The so-called “spirit of Gezi 
Park,” born of local discontents, is linked to a larger pattern of authoritarian regimes that have been undone 
by their own hubris as well as their inability to “deliver the goods,” in Central Eastern Europe, for example. 
  
Secondly, the mono-cultural militarized bureaucracy that has dominated the Kemalist Republic for decades 
discredited itself by way of the serious economic stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s. Repeated seizures of 
power, the economic collapse of 2000/2001, a 50% currency devaluation, aggravated poverty and chronic 
unemployment resulted in an egregious loss of state legitimacy, especially for the military, by 1980. In 
certain respects this mirrors developments witnessed in Argentina, Greece and other right-wing 
dictatorships during the seventies and eighties, and East European stagnation prior to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989. Women taking to the streets on behalf of traditional roles (banging empty pots or 
demanding the return of their “disappearing” children) have assumed iconic roles in this delegitimization 
(see Waylen 2007).  
 
Third, it is one thing for disadvantaged segments of the population to rail against endemic corruption and a 
lack of basic services like water and electricity. It is quite another for it to hit home, literally and figuratively, 
for elites. The 1999 Marmara earthquake killed roughly 40,000 citizens, and displaced another 250,000 in 
Turkey’s wealthiest province; many deaths were attributed to “construction amnesties” granted to 
contractors who had violated building codes, along with haphazard disaster response measures. One thinks 
immediately of 2008 Chinese earthquake victims, where substandard construction caused the collapse of 
7,000+ classrooms, resulting in thousands of school-aged fatalities. Although the AKP promised to tackle 
corruption early on, it has yet to operationalize investigation strategies, complaint procedures and 
international standards that would ensure active implementation new anti-corruption laws (see 
Ömürgönülşen/Doig 2012: 7 ff.). 




Fourth, Turkey’s economic opening has triggered a revolution of rising expectations regarding market 
liberalization, as well as resentment over the path that globalization is taking. Even religious-conservative 
Taksim Square protestors echoed “Occupy Movement” themes; what began as an Islamic movement has 
shifted, “not just in structure but also in content,” by way of the AKP’s “hyper-adaptation to global 
capitalism.” (Gümrükçü 2010: 163 ff.) The AKP’s electoral success in 2011 owed to a significant economic 
growth spurt in the Turkish heartland (“Anatolian tigers”) driven by private debt, but there is little evidence 
of wide-spread redistribution. Although per capita GDP has more than doubled ($10,800), 18% live below 
the poverty line and youth unemployment exceeds 20%.2 More likely to rebel than their rural counterparts, 
educated metropolitan youth pose a direct challenge to state legitimacy – as seen in Paris, Madrid and 
Athens. 
  
Fifth, describing itself as a “regional power,” Turkey has sought new status as an actor on the world stage, 
beginning with the 1996 UN Habitat Conference in Istanbul. Characterized as “neo-Ottomanism,” the AKP’s 
pro-active approach following the Arab Spring has lost its pro-reform edge. Erdoğan’s subsequent moves 
towards the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Iran, coupled with his antagonist rhetoric against Israel, have 
subjected the country to greater scrutiny abroad (Cohen/Freilich 2014: 39 ff.). The Syrian refugee burden is 
moreover straining scarce resources in the underdeveloped southeast region, intensifying human rights 
mobilization at home. 
 
Sixth, elite insistence on a paternalistic state rooted in a mono-cultural national identity is out of synch with 
diversity among Turkey’s own citizens. Family ties with Europeans of migrant descent, rural migration to 
cosmopolitan centers, personal travel, exposure to tourists and study abroad opportunities have shown 
many Turks the importance of “intercultural competence.” The AKP’s stress on “multi-ethnic Muslim 
identity” harkens back to the religious tolerance of the Ottoman Empire, while its “denationalization of 
Islam” has opened the party to erratic cooperation with Kurds and Alevis. Minorities are recognizing that 
their own appeals for human rights will be better served if reform demands encompass all persecuted 
groups: Cooperation with others becomes a litmus test for their own legitimacy. 
  
Seventh, internationally mandated cooperation, the discovery of shared grievances and new technological 
access to like-minded groups via the Internet and social media, is simultaneously expanding the Turkish 
understanding of democracy. Images of police brutality and reports of prominent journalists being detained 
2 Daniel Steinvort, “A Zone of Freedom: Youth Insurgency Challenges Erdoğan,” Der Spiegel, 11. June 2013, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkish-youth-insurgency-poses-challenge-to-erdogan-a-904984.html. 
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travels faster than authorities can respond (see Alemdar 2014: 568 ff.).3 According to a summer 2013 
MetroPoll, 53% of those surveyed consider the Turkish media “not free” (see Bozkurt 2013). Self-censoring, 
state-friendly media underscore a key criticism voiced by summer protestors: what Turkey still lacks is a real, 
effective parliamentary opposition. 
  
Eighth, societal change depends not only on quantity (how many citizens engage in protest) but also on the 
quality of their participation. Drawing on EU “Bologna standards,” Turkey is raising academic standards for 
universities, e.g., by altering the methods and content of classroom instruction and pushing faculty to 
publish in international, peer-reviewed journals. The last decade has witnessed a breath-taking expansion 
of the university system: the number of higher educational institutions grew from 76 in 2001 to 175 in 2013 
; 48 universities are located in Istanbul alone, stressing educational opportunity for women as well as men. 
One of the main bottlenecks remains the centralized entrance examination; the other challenge, as seen in 
Greece, Spain and France, will be to supply new jobs making good use of higher skill sets at an equally rapid 
pace. 
  
Ninth, one trait singled out by former Commissioner Frits Bolkestein – who described Turkey as “too big, too 
poor, too different” for EU membership – is itself becoming a crucial driver of democratic change (see 
Jacoby 2010: 109).4 As Karl Mannheim argued in the 1930s, “the problem of generations,” only younger 
cohorts have the ability to “cast off historical ballast.” Today’s Young Turks want to be active citizens. Even 
starkly religious groups have no interest in allowing a “Muslim Brotherhood” to dominate their movement. 
Erdoğan’s reaction to Gezi Park protests rested on an erroneous belief that he could re-assert control over a 
new generation by invoking his own “religious” authority, or by his appeals to parents to call their children 
home. Neither group is about to comply. 
 
Last but certainly not least, substantial monetary infusions from the European Union dating back to the 
1990s have promoted women’s rights, adult literacy programs, entrepreneurship support and the 
strengthening of civil society. These projects have fostered grassroots organizational skills while ensuring 
accountability to EU, UN and NGO donors. As locals professionalize and network, they internalize 
“collaborative, pluralist values,” a trend seen in Central East European member states during enlargement 
3 Reporters without Borders have described Turkey as the world’s “biggest prison for journalists,” beating out rogue 
states like China, Eritrea, Syria and Iran. In 2005, some 60 writers, publishers and journalists were on trial, leading the 
European Court of Human Rights to issue 100 rulings against Turkish court violations of freedom of expression by mid-
2011. Azadiya Welat, editor of a Kurdish-language daily, was sentenced to 166 years in prison, for example. 
4 The Commissioner for Internal Market, Taxation and Customs was referring to Turkey's physical size, its birth rates, 
and its lack of relative economic development. 
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(see Galligan/Clavero/Calloni 2007).5 The latter become stakeholders whose task is to forge cross-cutting 
identities and to build bridges between previously antithetical groups, with a long history of targeting each 
other as much as the state.  
 
We now turn to several concrete reform processes set in motion by Turkey's desire to join the EU, which 
Western feminists themselves used to reject as little more than “a rich man's industrialist club” (Valance; 
Davies 1986) – until they learned how to exploit its extraordinary potential for advancing “the balanced 
participation of women and men” across the member-states (see Abels; Mushaben 2012).  
  
Necessary but not Sufficient: EU Conditionality 
The democratic, economic and social demands that Turkey must meet in order to become a full-fledged EU 
member are not only being raised by external actors. Resting on thousands of pages of regulations, 
directives, decisions, and court verdicts known as the acquis communautaire, the requirements ascribed to 
“EU conditionality” entail a multi-stage negotiation process. In addition to enjoying the longest association 
with Community institutions (dating back to 1959), Turkey was the only state to have achieved full 
membership in the Customs Union in 1995, that is, well before the CEE countries were accorded candidacy 
status. Repeated military interventions (i.e., 1960, 1971, 1980, “postmodern coup” of 1997, “e-coup” of 
2007) triggered intermittent tensions, but its repeated applications for membership could not be rejected 
outright, due to the 1963 Ankara Agreement. 
  
The 1999 Helsinki Summit, followed by Council approval of Turkey's National Program for Adoption of the 
Acquis in 2001 opened the door to a vote to commence formal negotiations in 2004. The EU extended 
formal candidate status on 3. October 2005, holding out the prospect that Turkey could complete the 
process by 2014. Governed by a tripartite coalition consisting of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the Motherhood Party (ANAP) from 1999-2002, Turkey initiated the first 
of many reforms, starting with 30+ amendments to the post-coup constitution of 1982. The most nationalist 
of the three, the MHP opposed minority rights and elimination of the death penalty; it advocated active 
suppression of Kurdish/PKK terrorists and rejected moves by other groups against “the indivisible unity of 
the state.“  
 
Important reforms relating to gender included a constitutional amendment obliging the state to actively 
advance equality and a new Civil Code (2001) according women the same rights as men regarding divorce 
5 In fact, Poland and the Czech Republic have seen substantial “back-sliding” regarding gender issues, while Hungary 
faces potential sanctions over Prime Minister Urban’s efforts to pack the courts and restrict freedom of the press. 
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and child custody. Meltem Müftüler Bac observes that the government's willingness to promote “a reform 
package dealing with extremely sensitive issues while a party that has the most radical views on these was a 
coalition partner” came as a surprise even to EU officials (see 2005: 24). In December 2002, the Commission 
held that Turkey had fulfilled the “basic” Copenhagen Criteria, leading to further pre-accession financial 
assistance. Despite its own embrace of gender mainstreaming in 1996, neither the Commission nor the 
Council mentioned Turkey's egregious problems with violence against women in early evaluations or at 
meetings with national figures: The 2003 Progress Report devoted only two paragraphs to honor crimes and 
violence, compared to nearly thirteen pages on minority rights. Not until 2004 did the Commission begin to 
stress ”gender inequality” as a significant obstacle, later exploited to justify member-state Turcoscepticism 
over “cultural differences“ (see ibid; Canan-Sokullu 2011: 483 ff.). It is thus not surprising that the AKP 
“tends to interpret gender equality issues as a mere box-ticking exercise in compliance with the EU 
accession agenda.” (Dedeoglu 2012: 274) 
 
A successor to the outlawed Refah (Welfare) Party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) quickly 
recognized “democratization” as a way to pursue its own religious agenda. First elected in 2002, it used 
“minority,” “cultural“ and “human rights” discourse to publicize its understanding of religious freedom, e.g., 
women's right to hejab at state universities (see Müge Göçek 1999: 521-53; Hancock 2008: 165 ff.).6 
Reaping the benefits of earlier economic restructuring, the AKP adopted six further (EU impelled) reform 
packages between 2003 and 2004. The first set, focusing on “good governance” and institutional capacity-
building, encountered little resistance; it also liberalized laws on freedom of speech, cultural expression and 
association. The second extended political, cultural and welfare rights to Kurds, comprising roughly 18% 
(13.3 million) of the population.7 
 
The AKP moreover reduced the military's formidable control over security-related decision-making, financial 
and civilian affairs (e.g., through the Council of Higher Education, the Communication High Council, and the 
Supreme Board of Radio and Television) (Őzal 2012: 379 ff.). Penal Code revisions eliminating the death 
penalty took effect in 2005. Judicial reforms made it harder to ban political parties, outlawed torture and 
even repealed Art. 8 of the Anti-Terror Law used to imprison journalists for “crimes against the indivisible 
unity” of the Republic.8 All told, the Turkish state adopted nine constitutional reform “packages” between 
October 2001 and June 2004. Given the deep cleavages between modernizers and reactionaries, its early 
6 A 2008 law revoked a constitutional ban on religious symbols, especially Muslim headscarf use in public spaces (e.g., 
at universities), framed as a question of fundamental individual freedom. 
7 The 1982 Constitution contained no references to minority rights beyond Art. 42, which barred any language but 
Turkish as a “mother tongue”; as ethnic groups, Kurds, Kirmanchis, Zazas and others were “non-existent.” 
8 With limited effect: see Alemdar, as well as Amnesty International, Adding injustice to injury: One year on from the 
Gezi Park protests in Turkey, June 10, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/010/2014/en. 
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responsiveness to EU conditionality was nothing short of “remarkable” (Müftüler Bac 2005: 28). Progress 
slowed considerably after 2005, however, leading the Commission to recommend the suspension of 
negotiations by late 2006. 
 
The AKP's “gender policy” record has been quite mixed, becoming ever less woman-friendly since its 
electoral victory in 2011. Early Civil and Penal Code revisions brought formal legal equality (i.e., granting 
women and men the “same” rights), while subsequent welfare and employment reforms reinforced the 
family as the real focus of women's existence. Although the amended Civil Code accorded women equal 
rights to property acquired during marriage, new welfare rules undercut other types of economic security. 
The 2003 Labor Law banned sexual harassment and discrimination based on marital or family status but 
offered no support structures to reduce the “double” or “triple burden.” Companies employing over 150 
women are supposed to establish day-care facilities, but this leads firms to deliberately limit the number of 
women they hire (Dedeoglu 2012: 283). The Parliamentary Commission of Equal Opportunities for Women 
& Men, created in 2009, includes 50% females, including the chair (11 AKP, 3 CHP 2 MHP). 
 
By summer 2004, women were forced to rally against an AKP bill to reinstate a sexist adultery law 
(Ilkkaracan n. d.:247 ff.). The 2005 Penal Code criminalized domestic violence, marital rape, and genital 
examinations (“virginity tests”) undertaken without a prosecutor's consent – but denied consent-rights to 
women themselves.9 In 2004 lawmakers amended Article 10 of the constitution, obliging the state to secure 
“equality” in political practice: Women and men are equal. The state has the responsibility to ensure the 
implementation of these rights. Measures taken for this purpose should not be regarded [as] against 
the principle of equality. In 2010, however, the AKP appended the sentence: Measures for children, the 
elderly, the disabled, widows of injured and martyred soldiers and officers, and war veterans should not be 
regarded [as] against the principle of equality. Some 80 women's organizations opposed the addition, which 
reframed women as persons in need of as much “special protection” as other designated groups. Curiously, 
the state does not supply special protection where it is really needed: domestic violence is most pervasive in 
the rural east and southeastern regions. Adopted in 2005, the Law on Municipalities requires urban areas 
with over 50,000 residents to open women's shelters; by 2009, only 19 of 244 municipalities had complied, 
offering 54 shelters for some 40 million women (see Coşar/Yeğenoğlu 2011: 563).  
 
Simten Coşar and Metin Yeğenoğlu, among others, argue that the AKP's willing embrace of neoliberalism, 
actively promoted by the IMF and EU “Eco-Fin” actors, has altered the interface between its nationalist and 
9 The law had previously made distinctions between "virgin” and “non-virgin” victims when sentencing males for 
offenses against women's bodily integrity (e.g., abduction, rape, child abuse, abortion, pornography, prostitution and 
adultery). 
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religious aspirations (ibid.). Erdoğan has openly blamed both modern welfare state policies (reducing female 
dependence on men) as well as feminist efforts to secure women's individual rights “for the increasing 
dissolution of the... rationalised nuclear family.” He has disparaged feminists as “instigators of moral 
corruption” for “playing against nature and.... disrupting the natural order of the family.” (see 
Coşar/Yeğenoğlu 2011: 560) Under the terms set by the 2003 Labor Law and the 2008 Law on Social 
Security and General Health Insurance, married women are expected to engage in flexible, part-time home-
based work. The government even drew up a “Daily Working Plan of the Working Woman” according to 
which female laborers, simultaneously exhorted by Erdoğan to produce at least three children each, and 
  
are expected to submit to an exhaustive daily schedule in order to incorporate domestic affairs 
into the workday, amounting to over 15 hours in total. In this time schedule, women are 
expected to wake up and clean the house in ten minutes (06:00–06:10), to do “personal 
cleanup” and “to rest” in 30 minutes after work (18:30–19:00), to ensure that dinner finishes in 
15 minutes (19:30–19:45), to prepare dinner for the next evening in an hour (20:15–21:15), 
and to tidy rooms in 15 minutes. Only after that are they given time for personal work and rest. 
(Coşar/Yeğenoğlu 2011: 566) 
 
Accounting for 52% of the population, women comprise 24 % of Turkey’s paid labor force. Although it 
ranked third-last among OECD states (2010) in higher educational enrollments, the share of women 
attending tertiary institutions rose to 32.6% (see Ruthenberg 2012: 4). Female labor force participation 
nonetheless declined from 72% in 1955, to 28% in 1988 (partly due to a shrinking agricultural sector) to 22% 
in 2008. Two-thirds of all working women hold jobs not covered by the social security system (see Dedeoglu 
2012: 277f and Munin 2011: 449 ff.). Whereas single, divorced or widowed women could previously access 
health care through their employed fathers, dependent daughters now only enjoy this advantage until age 
25, well before they can establish themselves in the formal labor market. They must now rely on 
stigmatizing means tests. Roughly 36% of the population lack any type of health coverage, despite the AKP’s 
introduction of a Green Card system for the poor (largely covering the Kurdish population) (see Kiliç 2008: 
491). Turkey submitted a National Action Plan for Gender Quality, 2008-2013, but the AKP continues to 
define “poverty” as a problem of development, e.g., among forcefully evacuated Kurds, rather than as the 
outcome of discrimination.  
  
Women have much to gain from EU membership, which will bring equal treatment, positive action (rejected 
thus far by their own lawmakers) and gender mainstreaming to bear on Turkish employment and social 
inclusion policies. Although EU conditionality supplied a crucial jump-start to democratic reforms, as Gamze 
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Avci,and Ali Çarkoğlu observe, EU commitment to full membership has been losing credibility, bringing 
other reform processes to a stop (see Avci/Çarkoğlu 2011: 209 ff.). Still, as Leyla Zana, awarded the 
European-Parliament's Sakharov Prize in 1995, wrote to the EP president 2004, (formerly) jailed activists like 
herself “would rather be imprisoned in a Turkey negotiating with the EU than one that was not.” (Müftüler 
Bac 2005: 25) Turkish women have many new grounds to mobilize in opposition to a ever more religiously 
authoritarian AKP. 
 
Meeting with leaders of women’s rights associations to promote his “Democratic Opening for the Kurdish 
Issue,” Erdoğan categorically declared in July 2010: “Women and men cannot be equal. They are 
complementary. I do not believe in women–men equality. I am for equality of opportunity.”10 The Prime 
Minister attributes both Islamic “holiness” and nationalistic solidarity to Turkey “as naturally constituted, 
historically fixed states of being.” As one Gezi Park/Taksim Square protestor noted: “The whole world knows 
that it's about more than just a park and police brutality. The government's list of sins is long." A 33-year old 
artist likewise declared: "When it comes to women, the prime minister talks about our bodies as if they 
belonged to him…. He dictates to us how many children we should have and he wants to ban abortions, and 
yet he does nothing against the so-called honor killings, and against the daily acts of violence against 
women."11  
 
Given their own vulnerabilities, younger women are more sensitive to predatory practices against the 
environment, an unbridled construction boom, unregulated capitalism, coupled with intimidation of 
minorities and opposition members, the arrest of journalists, prohibitions on alcohol sales and 
advertisements (albeit not in profitable tourist areas) “and even kissing in public” (Blaser 2013).12  One can 
thus argue that the push for gender equality in Turkey has developed a dynamic of its own. It is not only the 
usual feminist suspects who want more effective participatory venues for articulating demands but also the 
very group who party officials insisted “have not been and will never be enslaved to feminist ideology”: 
female AKP parliamentarians and Islamist women.13  
 
 
10 Quoted in: Coşar; Yeğenoğlu 2011: 566. 
11 The Prime Minister also wants to ban Caesarian section operations. Quoted in: Daniel Steinvort, “A Zone of Freedom: 
Youth Insurgency Challenges Erdogan,” Der Spiegel, 11. June 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/turkish-
youth-insurgency-poses-challenge-to-erdogan-a-904984.html. 
12 Erdoğan even referred to Atatürk, an avid raki drinker, as a “drunk.” He insists that the national drink is ayran 
(yogurt), but most Turks would probably opt for çay (tea). See Noah Blaser, “Amid alcohol row, treatment options for 
alcohol abuse remain ‘almost nonexistent’,” Today’s Zaman, May 19, 2013. 
13 The full quote reads: “We do not support the conflict that is created by feminist thought between women and men. 
The women of [AKP] have not been and never will be enslaved to feminist ideology.” Fırat, quoted in: Cosar; Yeğenoğlu 
2011: 564. 
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The Fallacy of “One-Size-Fits-All“ Feminism Women's Mobilization in Turkey: 
While Western feminists have long criticized both “white male theoretical canons” and historically en-
trenched norms classifying women's needs as special, if not deviant interests, many have yet to liberate 
themselves from Besserwisserei tendencies relative to non-western gender movements. Given the domi-
nance of English language publications “theorizing” female oppression, gender scholars around the world 
now feel obligated to cite their own litany of modern-day saints (e.g., Audre Lorde, bel hooks, Judith But-
ler). As Gundrun Axeli Knapp cautions, however, “fast travelling concepts” like intersectionality --reduced to 
“race, gender class, et cetera” -- are quickly “abstracted from their epistemological premises, and stripped 
of their concretion, context and history” by scholars more interested in global theories than in local prac-
tices (see Axeli Knapp 2005: 254). Imposing its own ideational paradigms, academic feminism often judges 
women's movements outside Western boundaries as less advanced, despite their equally long “history of 
bargaining with patriarchy” (Axeli Knapp 2005: 557). This trend has been reinforced by the NGO-ization of 
gender campaigns, allowing international donors to dictate the definitions, indicators and time-tables ap-
plied to “equality.” Lacking relevant language skills, I have tried to overcome the ideational gap in this case 
by drawing almost exclusively on the works of Turkish scholars, writing in English or German.   
 
According to Deniz Kandiyoti, feminist movements in Turkey had no choice but to recognize nationalism as 
“the leading idiom through which issues pertaining to women's position in society” had to be articulated for 
many decades (2010: 167f). Dating back to 1923, Atatürk and his Republican successors insisted on a mono-
cultural framework for Turkish identity that denied legitimacy to but could not prevent violent clashes 
among single-cleavage groups, defined in terms of right vs. left, secular vs. religious, and majority culture 
vs. ethnic minorities. Paradoxically, the 1980 coup opened a big window of opportunity for paradigmatic 
shifts in consciousness and strategy among women's organizations. Saime Ozcurumez and Feyda Sayan 
Cengiz conclude that the “structural shock“ (not to mention the arrests and deaths) inflicted by the mili-
tary's ban on all right/left associations and parties reconfigured the institutional setting that had long dic-
tated how women's groups were required to act to ensure their own survival within the system (2011: 20 
ff.).  
 
The bottom line, as Gül Aldikaçti Marshall notes, is that the societal awakening that has given rise to 
“summers of discontent” in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and beyond owes less to “European modernizers leading 
recalcitrant Turks out of ignorance and obscurity… through top-down political reforms” than to women re-
claiming their agency based on a self-empowering civil society.14 In contrast to the country’s established 
political and bureaucratic elites, Turkish women were ready, willing and able to advance, once the EU 
14 Necati Polat, cited by: Johansson-Nogués; Jonasson 2011: 114. 
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opened the door to democratic transformation: “They knew what they wanted and what had to be done to 
accomplish their aims…. The long-term discursive struggle that marked the 1980s and 1990s allowed femi-
nists to develop agendas and tactics that they could use when the time was right in the 2000s,” despite oc-
casional steps backwards under the dominant AKP (Aldikaçti Marshall 2013: 12).   
 
One example involves the Progressive Women's Association, created under orders from the Turkish 
Communist Party in 1975: comprising a TCP auxiliary, its 20,000 female members had to couch any and all 
demands for legal, political and educational equality in terms of class, secularism and Kemalism. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the military's shut-down of pre-existing partisan and civil society associations after 1980 
“opened up space“ for a new wave of feminists to articulate particularistic demands, “emancipated if still 
unliberated“ from a “national good“ that ignored the private sphere and everyday life (see Kandiyoti 1987: 
317 ff.).  Wary of attracting political attention during the repressive post-coup years, women convened 
consciousness-raising sessions under the guise of tea parties, then in the form of “charity foundations.” 
Successfully lobbying for Turkish ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1986, they established information centers, gender studies 
programs, and feminist journals, then moved on to domestic violence and other issues linked to women's 
rights as human rights.    
   
The human rights master-frame, made possible by state ratification of CEDAW, and later the Beijing Action 
Platform, supplied international and national legitimacy, while granting equality activists a crucial 
instrument for identifying shared problems and sources of oppression, e.g., a strong state that persistently 
claims it represents “the best interests of the people despite the people.” (Arat 1999: 378) Melinda Negron-
Gonzales stresses the role of individual female activists who functioned as effective “brokers,” capable of 
constructing ideational bridges and steering  reconciliation processes among mutually hostile organizations. 
The latter moreover utilized confidence-building techniques to meliorate suspicion and mistrust, thereby 
cultivating a willingness to dialogue (see Negron-Gonzales 2012: 415 ff.). The early 1990s, especially, saw a 
shift from formal- to substantive equality demands. The mere existence of competing and conflicting groups 
contributed in a larger sense to pluralizing public space and opening alternative venues for women's 
democratic mobilization (see Arat 1999: 371).  
 
Military moves that crushed the right, the left and religious parties (with the assistance of a packed 
Constitutional Court)  after 1980 created an associational vacuum that women were able to fill because 
their activities, e.g., lobbying for CEDAW, were “deemed politically insignificant.“ (Arat 1999: 374) Building 
on Yesim Arat's categorizations, I delineate five distinct groups who are coming together on some fronts, 
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their major ideological differences notwithstanding. 
  
The “Saturday Mothers”  
Roughly 300 women, mostly mothers, first assembled in the central district of Galatasaray- Istanbul on 27 
May 1995, to protest a lack of information about relatives who had "disappeared" in(to) police custody. 
Reconvening every Saturday, they relied on their silence and maternal roles to lend legitimacy to demands 
for individual rights. State officials claimed that the missing were still in prison or off fighting with the Kur-
distan Workers’ Party (PKK) in East Anatolia. Engaged in a violent campaign against the purportedly terror-
ist PKK, they waited until the summer 1996 to try to “shame“ the Saturday protestors by gathering ”Friday 
mothers“ to stand at the grave sites of sons killed while fighting militants. Persistence among the former 
(and discrediting of the latter), attracted media attention, as well as recognition from Amnesty Internation-
al and the International Human Rights Association: In 1996 the European Parliament accorded the Saturday 
Mothers the Carl von Ossietzky Medal.  
 
Offering a symbolic response at best, the General Directorate of Security sent a van called the "Mobile Cen-
ter to Search for Lost People," but women refused to “register“ the names of missing relatives. On Septem-
ber 6, 1998, the state deployed its police forces, declared their protests illegal and took several mothers 
into custody. As Arat argued, Turkey’s longest civilian protest to date, lasting 173 weeks, conveyed the les-
son that “mothers no more belong (sic) to the house, but to the streets.” This lesson would be taken up 
again in the summer of 2013. (see Arat 1999: 376)   
 
Kemalist Women and Secular Feminists  
Like the women formerly associated with the Turkish Communist Party, Kemalist feminists were constrained 
by the nationalist paradigm, with its absolute commitment to secularism and republicanism. As the self-
appointed modernization agent, the Republic ‘s claim that women and men enjoyed the same constitutional 
rights rendered equality activists dependent on the state; the former blocked earlier efforts to create a 
Women’s People Party in 1923 as well as a autonomous Union of Turkish Women (1935). “State feminism” 
has trapped these activists in a double bind, insofar as public qua constitutional rights to education, 
employment and political participation have done nothing to transform deeply embedded gender 
expectations that women remain completely responsible for children and household management. 
 
Kemalist feminists proved quite resistant to forging alliances with Islamist women. Secularists actively 
opposed the Welfare Party-True Path coalition headed by the first female Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, who 
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had courted the female vote but ruled, in her own words, “like a man” (see Arat 1988: 1 ff.).15 Usually urban, 
well-educated and engaged in professional organizations, these equality advocates tend to be well 
connected to NGOs, having rallied 51 of them for a Women's Walk against Sharia in 1997. Another 80 NGOs 
protested the draft of the 2008 Social Security Law for promoting maternal roles and ignoring unpaid 
household labor. They moreover took vehement stands against Muslim headscarves, seeing them as the 
thin-edge-of-the wedge for propagating patriarchal religious values through AKP and Gülen infiltrated 
bureaucracies, educational institutions and civil society structures (see ibid. 2010: 869 f.). 
 
Some fears seem to be well-founded: Sunni-oriented religious instruction is now a required course in public 
schools, while relations between gender “state machinery” and women’s groups have seriously 
deteriorated under the AKP. The Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women (KSSGM) was 
established in 1990 to monitor CEDAW requirements. Already chronically understaffed and underfunded, 
the AKP-controlled Directorate is little inclined to cooperate with feminist groups. In 2007, for example, 
Director Nimet Cubukcu received faxes from 54 secular advocacy groups, condemning her “backward, 
discriminatory behavior.“ Contrary to CEDAW expectations, the AKP has combined or transferred various 
KSSGM functions to other agencies responsible for children, the elderly, the disabled and veterans’ 
relatives.  
 
Since 1997, civil society associations have nonetheless collaborated in drawing up “shadow reports” which 
have served as critical correctives to state submissions to the UN Committee on Status of Women. Partici-
pating organizations include the Federation of Women Associations of Turkey, founded in 1976; this roof 
organization pulls together entities concentrating on Researching and Examining Women’s Social Life; the 
Turkish Women’s Council; Turkish University Women; associations involving Ankara Women’s Health, 
Women Artists and Ankara’s Business and Professional Women; others center on Ankara Women Painters, 
the Protection of Women Rights, the Çamlıca Girl Schools, and Solidarity and Corporation with Village 
Teachers. Both UN and EU officials rely heavily on these Shadow Reports, realizing that the Turkish gov-
ernment “has had a tendency to frame every legislative change as a complete and fully satisfactory im-
provement of women's rights.” (Marshall 2013: 129) Other groups, like the Equality Watch Committee, 
Women for Women’s Human Rights/New Ways, Purple Roof, the Women’s Solidarity Foundation, Flying 
Broom, and the Women’s Centre (KAMER) engage in lobbying the state. According to Feride Acar, Gülbanu 
Altunok and Elif Gözdaşoğlu-Küçükalioğlu, most, unfortunately, “do not take intersectionality into account.” 
(2008: 33 f.)  
 
15 Feminists accused Çiller of providing proof that “no one dies because of lies.” 
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In 2004 a consortium of women’s civil society organizations applied for and attained formal membership in 
the European Women’s Lobby, before Turkey had even been accepted as an EU candidate country. Efforts to 
build “solidarity beyond borders,” has fostered tensions, however, between entities that are big and 
professionalized enough to secure grants and those that are not. “Lobbying and advocacy [have] become 
the territory of those who can come to be known as experts,“ ignoring those pursuing repetitive field work 
on a voluntary basis, more typical of religiously motivated women (Kuzmanovic 2011; Hassan 2011 and 
Negron-Gonzales 2012). 
   
Islamist Women and “Feminists of Faith”  
Women mobilizing on behalf of their own religious rights were also constrained for decades by “non-
fraternization” rules vis-á-vis secularist organizations. Muslimas began campaigning against headscarf bans 
on university campuses increasingly enforced by the Commission of Higher Education after 1987. New 
forms of activism split this segment into strict conservatives who want to “serve society“ in accordance 
with traditional religious dictates and reformists seeking educational, career and leadership opportunities, 
and/or women-friendlier interpretations of religious texts (see Hassan 2011). Describing herself as “a femi-
nist with faith,“ lawyer Sibel Eraslan has urged women to recognize that “neither husbands nor state au-
thorities have legitimate authority them: there is “no deity over 'them' but God.” Another lawyer, Zeynep 
Sen rejects feminism as a Western ideology, yet uses UN Development Program platforms to lobby for in-
ternational aid to Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya (see Arat 1999: 379). 
  
Following a long “history of hostility,” (Negron-Gonzales 2012: 417 f.) Islamist rights leaders linked to Milli 
Görüs founded Mazlum Der in 1991, with the aim of pursuing communication with a major human rights 
organizations (IHD) dominated by Kurdish nationalists and far left activists: The number of Islamic HR-
entities surged after the 1997 crackdown on religious activists and politicians (known as the post-modern 
putsch), giving rise to a growing network of national bodies with grassroots branches16 (see ibid.). Mindful 
of the 1993 Sivas Massacre of Alevis by Sunni Muslim radicals, Mazlum Der recognized the need to pursue a 
struggle on behalf of all oppressed groups as an Islamic duty -- beginning with Kurds long subject to arbi-
trary arrest, torture and forced evacuations. This reorientation supplied a new mantra along the lines of 
“We have suffered from this Kemalist ideological state and its associated military as much as you Kurds 
have.” (Yavuz/Özcan 2006: 109) 
 
16 Included among the participants were the IHD, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) and Mazlum Der, as 
well as smaller associations such as the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, the Turkish branch of Amnesty International, think 
tanks, professional and bar associations. 
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The Welfare Party (outlawed in 1997) and its partisan successors began to mobilize women, though not as 
decision-makers; female membership approached 65,000 (40%) in 1996 (see Arat 1999: 378). Beyond form-
ing women's commissions, the WP introduced crash courses on public speaking and interpersonal skills, 
equipping them for neighborhood recruitment. The Women's Commission in Istanbul drew on eighteen 
thousand volunteers to bring out female voters for the 1994 elections, securing mayoral posts in Istanbul 
and Ankara. Survey data indicate that female candidates, with and without headscarves, have become ac-
ceptable to a majority of voters; party affiliation is a much more compelling variable in determining elec-
toral preferences (see KONDA 2011 and Matland/Güneş/Tezcür 2011: 365 ff.). 
 
The period after 2000 saw a shift from informal to institutionalized cooperation, rooted in the trust that 
emerged out of positive collaborative experiences during the 1990s. Feride Acar and her colleagues count-
ed 300+ Islamist women’s associations focusing not only on headscarf bans  and “inaccurate” readings of 
religious texts but also on changes in national legislation that work against women. The Rainbow Women’s 
Platform encompasses 46 working groups; others included the Plane Tree Women’s Platform, the Capital 
City Women's Platform and the Women's Rights Organization against Discrimination. In 2008, the AKP-
dominated Grand Assembly changed the constitution for the first time to permit religious attire at universi-
ties; rule changes for parliament and government offices followed in 2010 (see Arat 2008: 11).17 
  
According to Acar, Altunok and Gözdasoglu-Kücükalioglu, “when Islamist women in Turkey voice their 
‘equality’ claims, they demand from the state the recognition of their difference as ‘Muslim women’ who 
might not be in an equal relationship (in the sense of sameness) with men.” (2008: 15) Developing equality 
claims of their own has occasionally exposed “feminists with a veil“ to admonition, scorn and alienation 
within their own faith communities. They are also disparaged by secularist women who label them “funda-
mentalist feminists.” Orthodox, non-feminist activists often oppose the externally funded “project culture” 
that has emerged in conjunction with EU pre-accession programs. Leading figures like Hidayet Tuksal , for 
example, see these activities as propagating Western cultural outlooks and lifestyles, rather than “genuine 





17 The AKP circumvented an earlier Constitutional Court rejection of any change altering the secularist nature of the 
Turkish state, by revising Article 10 to include women’s equality “in the procurement of public services” and amending 
Article 42 to read “no one would be deprived of the right to education unless openly articulated by law” (Arat, Religion, 
Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic Paradox, p. 11). 
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Kurdish and Alevi Women as Ethnic Minorities  
Despite the AKP’s insistence on preserving the national order, Erdoğan’s stress on  “multi-culturalizing” and 
“denationalizing” Islam (to improve relations with neighboring states), coupled with his defense of individ-
ual religious freedom for veiled women, has engendered a new democratic paradox. As Yesim Arat ob-
serves, the exercise of religious freedoms, encouraged by a democratically elected AKP government, has 
been accompanied by real and potential threats to gender equality. At the same time it has provided signif-
icant impetus to political cooperation among religious and ethnic women’s rights advocates. Shortly after 
the ban on headscarves was lifted, devout Islamic women created a blog and circulated a petition, calling 
for equivalent Kurdish and Alevi human rights and free expression (see Arat 2008: 869). Both groups have 
experienced more than their share of state oppression.  
 
 Not recognized as “real” Muslims, by orthodox Sunni and Shia factions, Alevis have experienced “multiple 
discriminations” since the founding of the Republic, as non-recognized ethnic minorities (Kurds, Karamchis, 
Zazas and others), and as leftist activists into the 1980s. Religious-cultural memory is rooted in various 
massacres inflicted by the Turkish majority: e.g., the Dersim uprising of 1937; the Sivas massacre of 37 
intellectuals and artists in 1993; and the retaliatory police killings of 20 Alevi protestors in Istanbul’s Gazi 
neighborhood in 1995 (see Ulusoy 2013: 300). Once in power, the AKP sought to remedy the “Kurdish” 
problem by way of religious recognition and poverty alleviation without recognizing the specificity of ethnic 
persecution. Erdoğan subsequently permitted the re-establishment of the (banned) Union of Alevis in 2003 
and creation of the first Alevi Institute in 2008. He has further supported Alevi houses of worship (applying 
mosque exemptions to their water bills) and has even attended ceremonies commemorating core Alevi holy 
days. Ayse Dursan notes that Alevi houses of worship are still denied state funding commensurate with 
official status. AKP reforms have been limited to according symbolic recognition, such as naming a public 
university after Alevi mystic, Haci Bektas-I Veli. The new Bosporus bridge has nonetheless been named after 
Yavuz Sultan Selim “the Grim,” responsible for the massacre of tens of thousands of Alevis in the early 
1500s. 
 
 The violent suppression of Kurdish demands for independence took place largely at the hands of Turkish 
nationalist and military forces (including those under Çiller). According to state estimates, over 380,000 
Kurdish residents were driven out of 905 villages and 2,523 hamlets by Turkish security forces and/or PKK 
combatants during the early 1990s; human rights activists report up to 3 million Internally Displaced Per-
sons (see Ayata/Yükseker 2005: 5-42). The IDPs included not only Kurds but also Assyrian Christians and 
Yezidi sect members. EU conditionality (i.e., references to minority protection in the Copenhagen Criteria, 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, and the acquis) finally moved the government to adopt a Return 
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and Village Rehabilitation project in 2002. By 2009, a mere 151,469 had returned; out of 2,234 applications 
for property restitution, only 287 had been approved by then under the Law on Compensation of Losses 
resulting from Terrorist Acts (2004) (see Yilmaz 1999-2010; FU Berlin 2011 and Ayata/Yükseker 2005). 
 
Kurdish expulsions from the rural southeast played a key role in the sudden mushrooming of illegal 
(gecekondu) “slum cities” outside major metropolitan areas, now responsible for high levels of poverty 
among the displaced. The AKP has sought to depoliticize the conflict by introducing policies to meliorate 
poverty and unemployment not by way of minority or human rights but rather as “development policy.“ 
(see Yöruk 2012: 523) The Prime Minister’s efforts to include Kurds in a new “Turkish Islam synthesis” (no 
longer pitting Islam against communism) has secured the AKP a growing segment of the East/Southeastern 
Anatolian vote. Cultural liberalization has resulted in the founding of Kurdish language schools, expanded 
TV and radio broadcasting, and collaboration with the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).  
 
The European Parliament has taken a particularly strong stand on human rights and against domestic vio-
lence, both very sensitive issues in the Anatolian and Kurdish regions. Accession brought 3.9 million Euros 
in subsidies to women's organizations in 2005 for programs “Combating Violence against Women” and for 
the “Promotion and Protection of Women's Rights.“ It committed another 5 million Euros in 2007 for ca-
pacity-building and technological development to foster the “Empowerment of Women and Women's 
NGOs in the Least Developed Regions of Turkey.“  While domestic violence and sexual assault are prevalent 
throughout the country, international organs (and the state) have tended to 
 
externalize the problem, attributing it to tradition and/or ethnicity—a product of Kurdish 
and/or “feudal culture” in South-eastern Turkey—rather than attempting to understand its re-
lationship to modern Turkey, its structures and its institutions. As the problems of “the other 
Turkey” and “other women” are externalized, gender issues or problems that “white Turk” 
women face in gender relations are often invisible or at best depoliticized in the way they are 
analyzed (Arat-Koc 2007)18. 
 
This renders women’s successful mobilization within the Peace and Democracy party all the more surpris-
ing. A self-proclaimed leftist party, the BDP has dramatically increased its share of women office-holders 
over the last decade. Half of the female mayors elected since 2009 are DTP/BDP members (although wom-
en's share of all mayoral posts is only 6-7%). It boasts of a female co-chair, makes use of the “zipper princi-
ple” for listing candidates, and applies a voluntary quota, which rose from 25% in 1999 to 40% in 2005. 
18 As quoted in Acar/Altunok/Gözdasoglu-Kücükalioglu 2008: 41. 
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Women who have engaged in active struggle or who have lost relatives enjoy preferential status. Eleven 
women (34%) secured parliamentary seats in the 2011 elections, despite the 10% threshold imposed on 
parties seeking to enter the Grand Assembly. No women had secured seats in 2002. Their growing presence 
has impelled both the AKP and the opposition CHP to gradually raise the number of female candidates they 
include in electoral lists, accounting for 13.5% and 14% of their respective mandates since 2011 (14.4% of 
all parliamentary seats). This is a dramatic improvement over the 4% figure for women's representation 
seen from 1935 to 2002.19 
  
Radical/Autonomous Feminists and Single-Issue Activists  
A multitude of Women's Studies centers and local initiatives against domestic violence and sexual assault 
also grew out of prohibitions on political activity after the 1980 coup. Among the better known groups are 
Purple Roof, Flying Broom and Women for Women's Human Rights/New Ways. All have been active in rais-
ing public consciousness, to take advantage of the “pincer effect” described by Anna von der Vleuten: that 
is, increasing “top-down” (EU, UN, NGO) and “bottom up” (local/provincial) pressures on lawmakers to in-
duce policy change. (see van der Vleuten 2012) 
 
Founded in 1990, the Purple Roof Shelter Foundation faces special challenges, given the arch-conservative 
judicial responses to abuse cases. In one instance, a judge dismissed charges after asserting that a man 
should “never leave a woman's back without a stick and her belly without a baby.” This triggered a 1987 
Mother' Day protest in Ankara with banners reading “Do you love your mother and beat your wife?“ (Mar-
shall 2013: 67) Radical feminists engage in direct actions, one of the more (in)famous being the distribution 
of seven-centimeter “Purple Needles” for use against sexual harassers. In 2009, a Parliamentary Commis-
sion on Equal Opportunity for Women recognized sex crimes against individuals, rather than stressing fami-
ly honor-- regardless of one’s “virgin” or “non-virgin” status. The Ministry of Justice recorded 61,469 rapes 
between 2002-2008, and another 29,980 from 2009 to 2011. The state no longer grants impunity to rapists 
who marry their victims, but the AKP has yet to end “virginity testing” for civil servants, or to try so-called 
“honor killings” as aggravated homicide. (see Acar/Ulug 2014) 
  
The Association to Support and Educate Women Candidates (known as KADER, meaning “destiny”) sup-
ports only women who accept its norms, including gender sensitivity and solidarity, commitment to ending 
discrimination and adherence to secularism. It relies on a decentralized, democratic structure based on 
committees, loosely bound to the center. Young Civilians comprises another example of autonomous mobi-
lization. Consisting of a small core thus far, it appeals to a new generation committed to pluralism and mul-
19 See: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2323_E.htm. 
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ticulturalism. It uses Facebook to link an estimated 10,000 Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Muslims, Chris-
tians, gays and other “civilian-democrats.” An earlier survey indicated that 8% assessed communication 
among civil society actors as “insignificant,” 73% as limited; women’s organizations constituted the excep-
tion to the rule. (see Kuzmanovic 2010: 434) Over the last five years, women's groups have generally cred-
ited new communication technologies and the Internet with helping them to mobilize issue-groups faster 
than was possible during the 1980s and 1990s (see Marshall 2013: 67). 
 
 As Yesim Arat holds, any project or issue that fosters dialogue, informational exchanges and the sharing of 
resources with groups formerly construed as ”the other“ generates internal change in otherwise bounded 
communities – and proves that such boundaries are permeable.1 Even those formerly described as 
“puritanical fundamentalists“ have been transformed by the experience, gradually shifting from an exclusive 
concentration on their own “difference“ to realizing that they share certain forms of oppression and 
inequality. The AKP's neo-liberal push for privatization has resulted in the destruction of many historical 
sites and neighborhoods, for example, Istanbul’s iconic Blue Mosque is now surrounded by skyscrapers. In 
Tarlabasi-Istanbul (“little Kurdistan”), the state tore down 278 buildings, 210 of which were under 
“monument protection” regulations, before turning the land over to a construction company owned by the 
Prime Minister’s son-in-law (see Yücel 2014: 57). Erdoğan's mega-construction plans are clearly at odds with 
his insistence on the superiority of Turkish “cultural traditions”; the latter seems only to apply to women's 
subordination to husband, household and nation.  
  
Women's groups have helped to expand the arena for civil rights mobilization: they have challenged the 
logic and the authority of a patriarchal state that has historically justified real-existing inequality by way of a 
mythical “unity” of national interests (see Arat 1999: 879). Earlier versions of the identity claims raised by 
diverse groups were detrimental to their cause: female citizens deemed political subjects only to extent 
that they accepted the dominant discourse without questioning pre-assigned gender roles. Decades of 
“bottom-up” experience have led them to develop consciousness distinct from male leaders of all sorts 
who have long instrumentalized them for their own political purposes.  
 
The state's overwhelmingly economic interest in EU membership has been subverted over time by other 
normative accession demands involving pluralist democracy, human and minority rights, equal treatment, 
gender mainstreaming, non-violence, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, et cetera. Although 
some women's organizations have enjoyed more financial and institutional support than others, activists of 
all sorts seem to have reached the conclusion that “the reforms we demand should take place not because 
of Turkey's candidacy to the EU, but because WE, AS WOMEN LIVING IN TURKEY WANT THEM and because 
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we have a full right to gender equality as equal citizens.” (cited in Marshall 2013: 114)The paradigm shift in 
women’s consciousness was clearly manifested in the protests exacerbated by Erdoğan's response to the 
occupation of Gezi Park.  
  
The Spirit of Gezi: Young, Political and Female   
My emphasis on domestic political dynamics notwithstanding, the summer 2013 protests that spread well 
beyond Gezi Park mirrored a number of social movement trends witnessed on other continents, largely in 
the spirit of an “anti-globalization” movement. What began as a pattern of “patchwork politics,” that is, as 
“the pursuit of policies... disintegrating the political space into disconnected spheres... and disregarding the 
axes of junction among these spheres“ (Coşar/Yeğenoğlu 2011: 556), eventually turned into a blanket of 
protest, covering the nation. 
  
According to Amnesty International, efforts to save the Gezi Park/Taksim Square areal in 2013 unleashed 
protests across 79 of 81 provinces, attracting an estimated 3.5 million participants. The period May to 
September produced 7,832 recorded injuries and nine deaths20 (2014: 15). Police fired over 150,000 tear 
gas canisters, in addition to arresting 3,773 participants and hapless passers-by. Nearly 50,000 individuals 
(but only five policemen) have subsequently been indicted across 17 provinces, e.g., for violating the Law on 
Meetings and Demonstrations, or for ties to Taksim Solidarity (a legal coalition of 100+ NGOS), organized 
crime or “terrorist organizations.” The Interior Ministry registered the destruction of 14 party and 58 state 
buildings, 68 surveillance cameras, 337 shops, 90 public buses, 214 private autos, 240 police cars, and 45 
ambulances, amounting to 140 million Lira (63 Million USD) in damages. (see Guttstadt 2014: 7) These 
sobering figures notwithstanding, many cities have seen the subsequent rise of citizen fora, promoting 
public dialogue on social issues. Noteworthy is the extent to which participants are generating awareness of 
previously shunned groups: roughly 50,000 attended the parade in Istanbul marking LGBT Pride Week (24-
30 June) after the Gezi crackdown, for example. (see Yücel 2014: 48) 
 
While concentrated populations and better access to organizational resources make it easier to promote 
civic activism in urban areas, the “Kodak moment” afforded by Gezi suggests that Turkish citizen 
engagement has increased significantly over the last decade. In a 1999 survey, only 7.8% of the respondents 
claimed membership in a civil society organization (CSO), despite a deeply rooted tradition of religious 
voluntarism. While 80% contributed to charitable causes, only 18% channeled their support directly to 
20 On June 16th, a 14 year-old boy from an Istanbul working class district, Berkin Elvan Okmeydanı, in Istanbul fell into 
a coma after being allegedly hit in the head by a gas canister fired at close range by a police officer. The day after he 
died, 12 March 2014, an estimated one million people took to the streets to attend his funeral. 
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CSOs. Membership data pointed to clear gender gap: 80% viewed women as significantly underrepresented, 
73% found upper class elites overrepresented. Figures from the government's Department of Associations 
pegged the number of female associational members at 770,671 in 2005, in contrast to 3,555,577 males. 
Generational change and access to new communication technologies seems to be rapidly narrowing the 
gap, at least in urban areas. Slowly expanding educational opportunity is also a contributing factor. 
 
The sea-change in women's willingness to engage directly with or against the state is perhaps best 
illustrated by the findings of an on-site survey conducted during the height of the Taksim Square/Gezi Park 
protests, prior to the brutal evacuation of June 13-15th. On June 6-7, the independent polling institute, 
KONDA Research and Consultancy, interviewed 400 participants at two-hour intervals across 30 hours, 
accruing 4,411 responses. Questions of “statistical representativeness” aside, the survey attests to a great 
deal of diversity among the participants.   
The so-called Spirit of Gezi is, first and foremost, young and techno-savvy. Authoritarian regimes seem to 
become particularly fragile at 20-year intervals in countries where women produce children at earlier ages. 
Nearly 43% of turkey’s citizens are under 25, 60% are under 35, too young to remember the 1980 coup. 
Only 37% were students; 17% had not been old enough to vote in 2011. The average age among the 
Gezi/Taksim demonstrators was 28; the average among the 69% who learned about the unfolding protests 
via social media was 26, but 40 who got their news through television (7%). Instead of covering protest 
developments, state controlled TV aired a BBC documentary film on “Penguins, subtitled “Spy in the 
Huddle”; outfitted with a gas mask, the bird immediately became an anti-censorship symbol. Erdogan's 
disparaging label “marauders” (capulcu) was also appropriated as a proud moniker by activists. An 
estimated 1.6 million “tweets” were sent under the hashtag #DirenGeziParki between May 29th and June 
3rd, 400,000 of which included photos or videos, another 1.6 mil under #Occupygezi and 1 million by way of 
#Diren Ankara. (Yücel 2014: 152) AKP officials were less successful in their efforts to “tweet” rumors 
regarding pizza and alcohol consumption in mosques.  
 
Once could argue further, that the Gezi Spirit is “the child of the prime minister” himself. Nearly half (47%) 
came to the Park or Square for the first time after witnessing police violence against demonstrators; 53% 
claimed to have never before engaged in political activities. A clear majority (58%) cited violations of 
political freedom as their core concern, 37% opposed AKP policies, and 30% Erdogan’s anti-protest stance, 
in particular. Only 20% stressed the original grounds for the site occupation, protecting the Park's existence. 
Police brutality brought people into the streets, but their diversity added ever more democratic demands to 
the agenda [Figure 4]. When police threw gas grenades, people lobbed them back, chanting “Olley!,” a 
common soccer stadium refrain. As journalist Tayfun Guttstadt noted, it was “a big mistake” for security 
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forces to take on a group that had grown up shooting police and/or other bad guys on video games. (2014: 
7) 
  
Secondly, the Spirit of Gezi is intent on redefining politics, policies and the nature of political participation.  
Among those eligible to vote in 2011, 13% had not cast ballots, 10% chose “independent” candidates, and 
7% submitted blank ballots. While 15.8 % had supported the AKP in 2009, one-third no longer identifed with 
any political party. While 21% were affiliated with a specific party or association, 58% of those who lack 
such ties identified with a group experiencing human rights violations. In urban crowds in which everyone 
was an other of some kind, individual rights took precedence over national, ethnic or religious grievances: 
“We don't need the AKP for religion, no CHP for the republic, no BPD for the Kurds and no MHP to preserve 
the nation. We are the people.” However, “a generation that questions everything cannot be [construed as] 
apolitical” (Yücel 2014: 37). While they do take cues from other protest movements (Arab Spring), even 
starkly religious groups have no interest in allowing a Muslim Brotherhood to dominate their movement. 
Indeed, Erdoğan's attempt to play the religious card backfired.  
 
Just as importantly, in a political culture scarred by repeated military coups, corruption and distrust, the 
Spirit of Gezi proved to be friendly, humorous, respectful and even romantic. Journalist Deniz Yücel 
observed that there was so much smoke caused by people grilling meat to share with participants joked 
Erdogan had sent the former instead of more police with tear-gas refills. Marking the month of Ramadan, 
various neighborhoods like Fatih organized fast-breaking meals after sunset, joined by secularists abiding by 
a self-imposed alcohol ban. Anticipating protest graffiti, police attacked one man who was innocently 
painting his steps in Cihangir, leading prominent writers, actors and artists who lived there start coloring all 
steps; some now face blacklisting. Owned by one of Turkey's wealthiest families, the luxury-class Divan 
Hotel opened its lobby and restrooms, provided tea and then a space for medical treatment when tear-
gassed protestors sought refuge: police tear-gassed the lobby in return. The owners were later hit with a 
175 million Euro fine for “false financial reporting” (Yücel 2014: 94). After “morality-defenders” at Ankara's 
Kurtulus subway station used a loud-speaker to admonish a kissing couple in mid-May, 200 young people 
showed up to stage an Kiss-In. (see Yücel 2014: 35) 
 
Last but not least, the Spirit of Gezi revealed itself as female. Women comprised 50.8%, men 49.2% of those 
surveyed. Hailing from 30 different districts, 52% labeled themselves “workers,” 37% were students, 6% 
were unemployed, and 2% were “housewives.” Among those active across Istanbul, 41% were workers, 14% 
were retired, 33% identified themselves as housewives (!), and 5% were jobless. Some 27 and 43% had 
graduated from high school, compared to 11 and 13% who held university degrees, across Turkey and at 
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Gezi, respectively. The Prime Minister's exhortation to women to produce more offspring resulted in posters 
and tweets with the slogan, “Do you really want us to have three children like us?” Less amusing is the fact 
that many female activists received anonymous rape threats.  
 
Although the women came to Gezi Park and other sites across Turkey as “protestors, not pin-up girls,” the 
media quickly adopted “the woman in red” as its favorite icon. A doctoral student in urban planning, Ceyda 
Sungur was photographed while being sprayed point-blank with a police tear-gas gun. She had no intent on 
becoming the poster-girl of the resistance, but her image was quickly reproduced on countless websites, 
buttons and posters, “prompting a whole heap of marriage proposals from rebellious romantics.” (Fitch 
Little 2013) Other photos depicted women suggesting a variety of life-styles, including a head-scarf wearer 
with a hand painted sign “We're here too, Girlfriend.” 
 
Rather than heed the Governor’s and Prime Minister's calls for parents to "bring their children home," a 
group of mothers formed a "human chain" between protesters and the police on June 13th the You-Tube 
images of which purportedly went “viral.” The maternal emphasis did generate ambivalence among some 
feminists; as one declared, “I came here as an individual, not as a role.” It nevertheless denied the 
government a chance to attribute the protests only to “extremists.” Turkish women are unlikely to 
experience the fundamentalist backlash and dramatic upsurge in sexual assault witnessed in conjunction 
with Arab Spring protests in Egypt and elsewhere (see Manea 2014: 81 ff.). As Harriet Fitch Little reported: 
 
When women raised concerns early on about possible harassment in the occupation, they 
organised as march and flyering campaign to make it clear that it wouldn't be tolerated, and it 
worked; in a camp crammed with over 1,000 adrenaline pumped rebels there was… an 
atmosphere of complete security and respect. When protest chants labelled Erdogan the son 
of a whore, women held seminars to explain issues the insult prompted. And when similarly 
unimaginative graffiti surfaced, they methodically painted over it. It didn't come back. 
 
Conclusion: Occupying “a Room of One’s Own”  
Patriarchal leaders and entrenched bureaucratic elites thought that they could pour Turkey’s new wine of 
globalization into the old bottles of Kemalist or neo-religious nationalism, but the combined effects of 
demographic change, expanding educational opportunity and EU conditionality have rendered their 
traditional gender-role mandates obsolete. In 2013, a new formula, “add women, technology and stir,” 
helped to rally demonstrators faster than authorities could respond. Gender-sensitive political change, 
however, not only depends on the number of citizens who mobilize but also on the quality of their 
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participation. The discovery of shared grievances, along with technological access to like-minded groups via 
the Internet and social media, has moreover expanded average citizens' understanding of democracy. 
 
Nearly 60% of Turkey’s citizens are under 35; younger cohorts who have come of political age since the 1980 
military coup have succeeded in “shedding 'the unbearable lightness of authoritarianism'” (Teti/Gervasio 
2011: 321 ff.)21. Monetary infusions from the European Union dating back to the 1990s have helped to 
promote women’s rights, adult literacy and grassroots organizational skills, but women’s domestic 
mobilization has taken on a life of its own. At the same time, the state's efforts to uphold a paternalistic, 
mono-cultural identity is increasingly out of synch with diversity among Turkey’s own citizens. The 
establishment of activist networks has solidified the position of new stakeholders ever more willing to build 
bridges between and among groups who used to target each other as much as they did the state. Minorities 
now realize that their own appeals for human rights will be better served if reform demands encompass all 
persecuted groups 
  
Although the European Union has contributed significantly to Turkey’s efforts to pursue “deeper 
democracy,” the Community itself is a long way from practicing the kind of gender equality it preaches to its 
member-states. At the same time, EU-28 leaders have been slow to recognize that the emergence of an 
indigenous civil society, the professionalization of stake-holder groups, and youth’s identification with other 
“think globally, act locally” campaigns since the 1990s will make it extremely difficult for Turkey to reverse 
its course. As Mehmet Ogutcu describes it, EU politicians “are still on ‘rewind’ instead of ‘play’” (Ogutcu 
2005: 3). External factors alone rarely precipitate the political-cultural changes needed to consolidate 
democratic pluralism and civil society. That requires “the interplay of internal contradictions and the 
decision of in-group actors to opt for a new identity synthesis that eventually brings about the actual 
change” (Johansson-Nogués; Jonasson 2011: 115).   
 
Surveys show that while most Turkish citizens are tired of being put on hold by EU politicians, an 
overwhelming majority welcome the reforms brought about by the processes of Europeanization per se. 
Neo-liberal austerity programs imposed in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis has subjected 
“western” women to a “two steps forward, one step backwards” dance, demonstrating that their own 
equality paradigms are vulnerable to attack. Although the strategies of younger Turkish women are 
grounded in very different nationalist, ethnic and religious prerequisites, indigenous gender advocates 
21 Teti and Gervasio suggest that authoritarian regimes are often more fragile than we think, following decades of 
coercion, corruption and co-optation. “Although most observers of Middle Eastern affairs were well aware of the lack 
of legitimacy most regimes suffered from, this did not translate into scepticism about their solidity.” The problem is 
that neither analysts, the rulers, nor protestors themselves anticipated a full-scale collapse “because ferocity and 
strength were so easily conflated.” 
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“have a great deal to lose, and they know it” (Kandioty 2010: 175). As one woman wearing a tear-gas 
canister-necklace told a reporter for the New Statesman (savor the irony of that magazine title), “here 
women fought with men, resisted with them, and changed their opinions... I hope that is the lesson that 
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